Bank underwriting of corporate bonds: Evidence from Japan after 1994 by Hamao, Yasushi & Hoshi, Takeo
Bank Underwriting of Corporate Bonds:
Evidence from Japan after 1994
First Draft: April 1997
This Version: June 1997
Yasushi Hamao





Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies






We thank Goldman Sachs (Japan) for providing data; Serdar Dinç, Tadashi Kikugawa and
participants of the Hugh Patrick Festschrift Conference for useful comments and conversation;
and Mingzhu Wang for research assistance.  Hamao gratefully acknowledges support from the
Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Professorship at Columbia University.
1ABSTRACT
This paper examines a recent major change in the corporate bond primary market in Japan,
namely bond underwriting by bank subsidiary securities firms.  We analyze yields on corporate
bonds at the time of issue, searching for evidence of conflict of interest, bank certification,
distribution advantage, or aggressive entry strategy by banks.  Bank subsidiaries have been
successful in acquiring the underwriting business of firms which have been reducing their ties with
main banks through decreasing loans, rather than serving firms for which the parent banks are the
main banks.  This tendency is especially clear in the more recent period.  After controlling for firm
and bond characteristics, the choice of underwriter (existing or bank subsidiary securities firms)
generally does not have a material impact on yield spread.  On the other hand, when the choice of
underwriters is interacted with the maturities of corporate bonds, there is some evidence of net
certification effect and/or aggressive pricing for bonds with longer maturities, which would have
less competition with bank loans.
21. Introduction
One of the features of the Japanese postwar financial system is a clear division between
banking and the securities business.  Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1948 
explicitly prohibited banks from underwriting securities.  As financial markets underwent rapid
product innovations from the late 1970s, this division, along with other partitions within the
banking industry (city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks) became a subject of
discussions on deregulation.  The resulting change is the Financial System Reform Act which
became effective on April 1, 1993.  This law is intended “to promote the healthy development of
financial markets through effective and proper competition and to give incentives to financial
institutions to better serve their clients through the introduction of a variety of new products”
(Ministry of Finance (1994)).  One of the major changes under the new law is the lowering of the
traditional wall between banks and securities firms, allowing banks (securities firms) to set up
their security firm (trust bank) subsidiaries.  The implementation of the law, however, was
deliberately slow, and new subsidiaries were approved only gradually.  For bank subsidiary
securities firms, the first three banks that received licenses were the Industrial Bank of Japan, the
Long-term Credit Bank of Japan, and Norinchukin Bank, which established their subsidiaries on
July 26, 1993.  City and trust banks followed, with the last one to start business opening its doors
in November 1995.  (See Table 1).  The business activities of these bank subsidiary securities
firms are still limited in equity and equity derivative transactions.
This paper compares the characteristics of straight corporate bonds underwritten by
existing securities firms and bank subsidiary securities firms.  In making and monitoring loans,
commercial banks acquire private information about a firm that is not available to general
See, for example, Finance Ministerial Order, Banking #610 (April 1, 1993), which orders1
“Parent banks or subsidiary banks of securities companies are not allowed to receive undisclosed
information about security issuers or customers of their related securities company, or provide
such information to the related securities company.
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investors in the securities market.  Thus, if banks are allowed (through subsidiaries in the Japanese
case) to underwrite corporate securities, a conflict of interest can develop.  For instance, banks
can underwrite corporate bonds issued by a firm that they privately know is unsound and then
require that firm to use the proceeds to repay loans, transferring their risk to general public
investors. 
The Ministry of Finance has set up a Ministry Order to prevent such conflict of interest
(“firewall regulation”).  But since Japanese commercial banking features a tradition of strong1
relationship banking as seen in the main bank system (see for example, Aoki and Patrick (1995)),
it is nevertheless of interest to examine if there is any evidence of conflict of interest.  If there is a
conflict of interest, rational investors would require higher yields on securities underwritten by
bank subsidiaries.  If the underwriter’s parent company is the main bank of the issuing firm, this
effect may be even stronger.
On the other hand, underwriters can certify the value of the new issue.  Having more
information about a firm, banks would have a greater ability to certify than would their
counterpart securities firms.  Since correct certification by underwriters would improve their own
reputation, they have an incentive to do so.  Certification would lead to a lower yield for bonds
underwritten by bank subsidiaries.  Again, in the case of main banks, the effect may be even more
prevalent.  We examine the extent of the certification effect in the Japanese corporate bond
market.
4Another possibility is that securities firms, having more accumulated skills with regard to
pricing and distribution of corporate bonds compared to newly established bank subsidiaries, may
have some advantage in placing corporate bonds.  This would lower yields on bonds underwritten
by existing securities firms compared to those underwritten by bank subsidiaries.  We will also
examine this hypothesis.
The move toward “universal banking” is a global trend.  There is a controversy regarding
banks’ engaging in corporate bond underwriting in the United States where traditional prohibition
of such activities by the Glass-Steagall Act is now being actively discussed.  Kroszner and Rajan
(1994) and Puri (1996) both examine data from the pre-Glass-Steagall period.  The former find
that the public rationally accounted for the potential conflict of interest.  The latter finds banks’
certification effect to be significant so that investors were willing to pay higher prices for bank-
underwritten securities.
White (1986) examines the relation between banks’ involvement in the securities business
and their probability of failure during the pre Glass-Steagall period.  He finds the probability of
failure was actually lower for those banks which were actively involved in the securities business. 
Hoshi (1996) examines pre-war Japanese corporate finance when banks dominated the corporate
bond underwriting business.  He finds that the failure of banks during both the financial depression
in 1927 and the depression after Japan’s return to the gold standard (1930) was unrelated to the
banks’ involvement in the securities business.
Our paper is the first to examine current evidence of this issue in Japan.  For the United
States, Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter (1997) look at securities underwritten by Section 20
subsidiaries of U.S. commercial bank holding companies and find that yields are lower for bank
5subsidiary underwritten bonds issued by lower credit rating, consistent with the certification
effect.
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we describe the data and the
selection of the sample.  In section 3, we report empirical findings.  Section 4 concludes.
2.  Data
We examine primary market data for domestic corporate straight bond issues from
February 25, 1994 (first occurrence of bank subsidiary’s underwriting) to September 30, 1996. 
The original data are collected from Nikkei NEEDS “Corporate Action” magnetic tapes, which
record all changes in corporate financing through financial markets (new issues of debt, equity or
convertible securities, retirement of securities, conversion of convertible securities, etc).  We
chose only domestic public issues because underwriters’ identities are not available for Euro and
privately placed issues in this data set.  Only straight bonds are considered since (1) they have
become a major financing tool for Japanese corporations during the time period we examine, and
(2) we would like to have a direct comparison with traditional bank loans.  We also exclude bonds
issued by NTT and electricity power utilities from the analysis.
The attributes we use in this data set are: date of issue, identity of issuers, industry code,
issue amount, maturity, coupon rate, issue price, JBRI (Japan Bond Research Institute) ratings,
use of funds, and lead underwriter of issues.  The JBRI ratings do not cover the entire universe of
issuing firms, and the use of funds can be (1) investment in equipment; (2) operation funds; (3)
repayment of debts; or (4) others (such as investment in subsidiaries).  Multiple reasons may be
recorded for a single issue.
6We also use data on the Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) as a basis to compute yield
spread at the time of the issue.  The JGB yield with a matching maturity to a new corporate bond
issue is computed by interpolating yields of two bonds with closest maturities.  For example,
suppose a corporate bond is issued on May 20 with 4 years of maturity.  Then two JGBs are
searched; one with a maturity just short of, but closest to 4 years (e.g., 3 years and 350 days) and
another with a maturity just over, but closest to 4 years (e.g., 4 years and 10 days), as of May 20. 
The yield to maturity of these two JGBs are averaged and used as a benchmark for this corporate
bond issue.  The yield spread is defined as yield to maturity of corporate bond minus its
benchmark JGB yield to maturity.  The JGB yield history data are provided by Goldman Sachs.
Additional data on characteristics of the issuing firms are obtained from NEEDS financial
statement data and Hamao (1991) monthly stock returns data.  The items we use are:  market
value of outstanding equity, total debt, total loan, EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes), and
interest expenses.  They are used to compute size of the firm, market debt-to-capital (debt plus
market value of equity) ratio, bank loan-to-total debt ratio, and interest coverage ratio (earnings
before interest and taxes over interest expenses).  The data are as of the closest previous
accounting cycle.
Finally, data on the main bank relationship are taken from Kigyo Keiretsu Soran.  For each
exchange-listed firm, a main bank is identified as the lender with the largest share, and the ratio of
loans by the main bank to total debt is computed.  When a company has no bank loan outstanding,
we interpret that the company has no main bank.
3.  Empirical Investigation
The share of bank subsidiary securities firms is larger when it is calculated for the number2
of underwriting than when it is calculated for the value.  This implies the bank subsidiaries tend to
underwrite smaller issues than do other securities companies, as we confirm in Table 3.
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3.1 Share Growth of Bank Subsidiary Securities Firms
During the short period of time, bank subsidiary securities firms have aggressively
increased their share of the bond underwriting business.  Table 2 shows number and the amount of
domestic straight bond issues by Japanese corporations from the second quarter of 1994 to the
third quarter of 1996.  Soon after all the major banks established their securities subsidiaries in
November, 1994 (see Table 1), their share in corporate underwriting jumped to 34% in value and
42% in number (1st quarter of 1995).  Bank subsidiaries continued to increase their influence and
by the end of our sample period (3rd quarter of 1996), their share had reached 48% in value and
55% in number.  Thus, in a little over three years from the establishment of the first bank2
subsidiary securities firms, they have quickly become major players in the corporate bond market.
The remarkable growth of bank subsidiary securities firms may be less surprising if one
notes the close relationship between Japanese banks and firms nurtured through the main bank
system.  Even before the passage of the Financial Reform Act of 1993, Japanese banks played the
role of trustees for their customers placing corporate bonds in the domestic market.  When
Japanese corporations issued bonds abroad, Japanese banks often served as guarantors and
sometimes co-underwrote bonds with Japanese securities houses.  As Campbell and Hamao
(1995) have shown, the trustees of domestic bonds and guarantors of foreign bonds were most
likely to be the main banks of corporations.
It is natural to expect the main bank relationship to involve a bank subsidiary securities
company when the main bank has one.  Thus, when a company uses a bank subsidiary to
8underwrite bonds, we would expect the company to use the securities subsidiary owned by the
main bank.  Our data are generally consistent with this expectation.  When a company used a bank
subsidiary, the subsidiary was owned by the company’s main bank in 64% of the cases.  If we
limit the attention to those firms with a main bank that indeed has a securities subsidiary, the
proportion increases to 77%.  But we also find a sharp fall of the proportion of main bank
subsidiary underwriting in the total underwriting by bank subsidiaries.  Figure 1 shows this trend. 
In 1994, bank subsidiaries only underwrote bonds issued by their parent banks’ customers.  Until
the end of 1995, the proportion of the main bank underwriting stayed above 80% (calculated in
terms of the number of issues).  In the last quarter of 1995, the ratio dropped to around 50%,
where it stayed throughout 1996.  Thus, main bank underwriting has declined over time.  In other
words, the bank subsidiary securities companies started to underwrite the bonds of corporations
that do not have their parent banks as their main banks (or do not have any main bank).
The growth of underwriting by bank subsidiary securities companies, which is seemingly
expanding beyond traditional main bank ties, would not have serious economic implications if it
were just like that of established securities houses.  But, as discussed in the introductory section,
there are some hypotheses that suggest underwriting by bank subsidiaries is different from
underwriting by securities houses.  The rest of this section studies this difference using our
database.
3.2 Characteristics of Bond Issues
Table 3 reports the means of the major variables in our database.  As discussed in the
previous section, the JGB yields we used in calculating the spread are for bonds with maturity up
9to 10 years.  Consequently, we dropped from our sample issues with maturity longer than 10
years.  (There are eight of them.)  Four issues with floating coupons were also dropped.  For
twelve cases, we could not calculate loan to debt ratio of issuing firms since they do not have debt
outstanding at the end of most recent accounting period.  In one case, the market value of equity
was not available at the end of the most recent accounting period.  Eliminating these cases leaves
us 432 issues out of the original 457 issues.
The means for the entire sample of 432 are reported in the first column, and the other two
columns report the means for the cases where the lead underwriter is a bank subsidiary (182
observations) and the cases where the lead underwriter is the bank subsidiary owned by the main
bank (118 cases).  
The table reveals several interesting differences between the issues underwritten by bank
subsidiaries and those underwritten by securities houses.  First, the issue size is substantially (and
statistically significantly) smaller for the issues underwritten by bank subsidiaries.  This is what we
would expect from Table 2, which showed the share of bank subsidiaries to be larger when it is
calculated using the number of issues.  Thus, compared with securities houses, bank subsidiaries
seem to bring more small issues to the market.  If small companies tend to issue a small amount of
bonds, this result may support the hypothesis that bank subsidiaries (through their ties to the
banks) have an advantage in assessing the value of smaller firms.  But, more direct measures of
firm size, such as capitalization and total assets, do not show much difference between the issues
underwritten by bank subsidiaries and those underwritten by securities houses.
Second, the spread is slightly higher for issues underwritten by bank subsidiaries, but
slightly lower if the underwriter is a subsidiary of the issuer’s main bank.  The difference,
10
however, is not statistically significant.  We examine the effects of underwriters’ identity on the
spread in more detail below by estimating regression models.
Third, the companies that use bank subsidiaries for underwriting their bonds tend to have
higher loan-to-debt ratios and higher dependence on the main bank (measured by the ratio of the
loan from the main bank to the total debt).  The difference is clearer (and statistically significant)
for the companies that use the securities subsidiaries owned by their main banks.
Finally, there seems to be a weak correlation between the use of bank subsidiary securities
companies and the stated purpose of issuing bonds.  The companies that use bank subsidiaries are
more likely to list repayment of debts as one of the primary uses of funds and less likely to list
investment.  This may imply the existence of conflict of interest.
3.3 Regression Results
To examine the characteristics of bond underwriting by bank subsidiary securities
companies in more detail, we estimate two sets of regression models.  The first set of regressions
focuses on spread as the dependent variable and asks whether bank underwriting influences the
magnitude of spread.  The second set examines the factors that influence the choice of
underwriter.
Table 4 shows the estimation results for the first set of regressions.  In order to control for
the effects of firm characteristics (other than the identity of bond underwriter), the regressions in
columns 1 and 2 include the amount of total assets (in log), the debt-to- capital ratio (in market
value), the interest coverage ratio, the loan-to-debt ratio, and industry dummies (for which
coefficient estimates are not reported).  Two dummy variables to control for the effect of maturity
Indeed, it is often the case that 7 year JGBs are the cheapest to deliver against JGB3
futures which has a delivery option.
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on the spread are also included in the regression.  The first dummy variable (Maturity < 5 years)
takes the value one if the maturity of the bond is relatively short (3, 4, or 5 years) and zero if the
maturity is long (6, 7, 8, or 10 years).  We also included a dummy variable for the bonds with 7
years of maturity since there is an anomaly in the JGB market that 7 year JGB tends to be
relatively cheap (higher yield) compared to the fitted term structure model.   Col mn 1 estimates3
the effects of the use of bank subsidiaries on the spread and column 2 examines the effects of the
use of main bank subsidiaries.  In both regressions, the control variables enter the regressions with
expected signs, although the statistical significance is only marginal in some cases.  Size,
measured by the log of total assets, is an important determinant of the spread.  A larger
corporation enjoys lower spread.  The existence of debt, and especially bank debt, increases the
spread as the coefficient estimates on the debt-to-capital ratio and the loan-to-debt ratio suggest. 
Finally, good performance of the company compared to its debt obligation (measured by the
interest coverage ratio) reduces the spread.  The coefficient estimates on the short maturity
dummies suggest that the spread tends to be higher for bonds with relatively short maturity.  If the
yield curve is upward sloping (which is the case for our sample period), this implies that the yield
curve for Japanese corporate bonds at the time of issue is flatter than that for the government
bonds.  The coefficient estimate on the 7 year maturity dummy confirms the existence of an
anomaly in the JGB yield curve.  The yield on the 7 year JGB is exceptionally high, which reduces
the spread estimates.  The regressions in columns 1 and 2 suggest that the use of bank subsidiary
securities companies, whether they are main bank subsidiaries or not, does not influence the
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spread very much.  Although the estimates in both specifications are negative, suggesting that the
certification effects may dominate the conflict of interest effects, the estimates are not statistically
significant.  The magnitude of the estimates is also small.  Even the larger estimate implies that
using the securities subsidiary of the main bank reduces the spread by less than 4 basis points. 
Compared to the sample mean of the spread (26 basis points) or the sample standard deviation
(32 basis points), this is a small number.  Thus, the regression result suggests the difference
between bank subsidiary securities firms and existing securities houses is not only statistically but
also economically insignificant, as far as the spread is concerned.
For a subset of the observations, we can use the bond rating by JBRI to control for the
firm characteristics.  Columns 3 and 4 replicate the regression analysis in the first two columns for
the sample subset by replacing size and financial variables with rating dummies.  The industry
dummies are still included in the regressions although their coefficient estimates are not included
in the table to save space.  The rating dummy for AAA- and AAA is dropped to avoid
multicolinearity.  We find that the coefficients on the rating dummy for BBB and BBB+ is positive
and statistically significant, implying that those firms have higher spreads than those with AAA- or
AAA ratings as one would expect.  The coefficient estimates on other rating dummies, however,
are not reliably different from zero, suggesting that the spreads for the bonds issued by A or AA
firms are not much different from those issued by AAA firms.  As to the effects of bank subsidiary
underwriting on spread, we do not find any significance, similar to the results for the first two
columns.  Thus, the regressions in Table 4 suggest no significant implications of bank subsidiary
underwriting on spread, after controlling for other firm characteristics.  The bank subsidiaries
appear to be just like other securities houses, and there is no evidence of strong conflict of interest
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or certification effect.
One may expect the extent of the conflict of interest effect to depend on the maturity of
the bond.  For example, bonds with relatively short maturity may be close substitute of bank
loans.  Then, underwriting of bonds with short maturities by bank subsidiaries is more likely to
cause suspicion of conflict of interest than bonds with longer maturities.  This possibility is
explored in Table 5.  Again the first two columns report regressions for the entire sample and the
last two columns report the results for the JBRI rated issues.  In the specification of Table 5, the
dummy variable that indicates bank underwriting or main bank underwriting is interacted with the
dummy variable for short maturities (less than or equal to 5 years).  This allows us to estimate the
effects of bank underwriting on the spread for issues with short maturities and those with long
maturities separately.
The result indicates that the bonds with long maturities that are underwritten by bank
subsidiaries tend to have lower spreads, suggesting that the certification effect dominates for these
issues.  But the coefficient estimates are statistically significant only in the first column.  The
magnitude of the point estimates is still small, ranging from 6 to 8 basis points.  When the
maturities of bonds are short, the effect of bank underwriting is close to zero.  The point estimate
in the first column implies that the bank underwriting of bonds with short maturities increases the
spread (consistent with the net conflict of interest effect), but the coefficient is not statistically
significant.
Even though the evidence is weak, the results in Table 5 suggest the possibility that the
effect of bank underwriting on corporate bond yields may be more serious for the bonds with
short maturities, which are close substitutes for bank borrowing.  If the effect of conflict of
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interest is large enough to offset the certification effect, we would find bank underwriting does
not influence the bond yields, which is the results in Table 5.  For bonds with longer maturities,
the conflict of interest may be less serious and the certification effect may dominate.  The results
in Table 5 are mostly consistent with this view, although the estimates are often not reliably
different from zero.
As we noted in discussing Figure 1, the proportion of main bank underwriting in total
underwriting by bank subsidiaries has been declining.  Over time, the bank subsidiary securities
firms have started underwriting bonds of issuers without main bank ties.  This trend may have
influenced the extent of conflict of interest or certification effects in bank underwriting of
corporate bonds.  The regressions in Table 6 examines this point.  We split the sample into two
sub-periods according to the issue date and replicate the regressions in the first two columns of
Table 5.  We chose October 1, 1995 as the threshold, since by this time bank subsidiaries have
started to underwrite corporate bonds for firms whose main banks are not their parent banks.  The
results in Table 6 suggest that the effects of bank underwriting for bonds with long maturities are
negative in both sub-periods , although the coefficients are less precisely estimated in the earlier
period.  The effect on bonds with short maturities are often not reliably different from zero, but
the coefficients for after October 1, 1995 are positive (though only the third column shows
marginal significance and the magnitude is small).  We obtain similar results for JBRI rated issues
(not reported); weak evidence for certification effects in both periods and the conflict of interest,
if it exists, is found only in the second period.
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This conclusion, however, is not robust to time periods.  When we examine sub-periods,
we find weak evidence (in each period) that suggests corporate bonds underwritten by bank
subsidiaries have spreads different from those underwritten by securities companies.  In Table 5,
we split the sample into two sub-periods according to the issue date and replicate the regression
analyses.  We chose October 1, 1995 as the threshold, since by this time bank subsidiaries have
started to underwrite bonds for corporations whose main banks are different from the parent
banks (or who do not have main banks).  (See Figure 1.)  Columns 1 and 2 report the regression
estimates for the period before October 1, 1995.  During this period, the coefficient estimates on
the bank subsidiary dummy and the main bank subsidiary dummy are negative, although their
statistical significance is marginal.  This suggests the bonds underwritten by bank subsidiaries
enjoyed lower spreads during the period before October 1, 1995, which is consistent with the
certification hypothesis.  The slightly larger and more significant coefficient on main bank
underwriting is more promising for this hypothesis.  In this earlier period, existing securities firms
must have had more distribution advantage and they must have been able to offer lower rates. 
But the negative coefficients for bank subsidiaries imply that they are instead offering lower yields
than existing securities firms.  This is consistent with the view that the bank subsidiaries offered
better rates to attract business in the earlier period.
Columns 3 and 4 show a similar regression analysis for the period after October 1, 1995. 
This time, bank underwriting variables enter positively, although the statistical significance is
again marginal.  The result is consistent with a conflict of interest hypothesis.  It is also consistent
with the story that existing securities companies are now enjoying some distributional advantage. 
The coefficient and the significance level are slightly higher when the main bank underwriting
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variable is included, indicating the net effect of conflict of interest (i.e., net of certification effect)
is more prevalent for bonds underwritten by main banks.
Table 6 replicates the analysis for firms with JBRI ratings.  The results are consistent with
those in Table 5.  While bank underwriting reduced the spread for the first sub-period, it increased
the spread during the second sub-period.  Together with Table 5, this confirms that when we
estimated the regressions for the entire sample period in Table 4, we found no effects of bank
underwriting because the opposite effects of the two sub-periods canceled each other.
These results can be interpreted as follows.  In the earlier period when bank subsidiaries
were establishing their bond underwriting business, main bank subsidiaries managed to have larger
shares (Figure 1).  During this period, underwriting by banks had a net certification effect.  The
effect is slightly larger for bonds that were underwritten by main banks who have more
information about the issuing firm.  On the other hand, as the market matures and main bank share
declines in the later period, investors became aware of the potential conflict of interest in bank
underwritten bonds and required higher yields.  The main bank underwriting again stratifies this
result, especially for firms with JBRI rated firms which presumably produce more public
information.
In examining of the choice of bank subsidiaries, we estimated several probit models which
attempt to explain the choice by the financial variables and main bank ties.  The examination
revealed that the single most important variable for the choice is the size of the issue.  When the
size of the issue is small, it is more likely to be underwritten by a bank subsidiary, as was pointed
out in the discussion of Table 3.  Other financial variables, such as debt-to-capital ratio or the
interest coverage ratio do not seem to influence the choice of underwriter.  Having a main bank
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tie does not make it more (or less) likely for a corporation to choose a bank subsidiary over a
securities house as the underwriter of bonds.
Table 7 shows an example of our probit analysis.  The only variable that enters the
regression significantly is the issue size.  The coefficients on the other variables are not different
from zero.  The result does not change even when we split the sample into two sub-periods.  The
coefficient on the dummy variable that takes one when the main bank has a security subsidiary is
positive before October 1995, suggesting the main bank ties were more important consideration in
the choice of bank subsidiaries as bond underwriters.  But, the coefficient is not statistically
different from zero.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we examined a recent major change in corporate bond primary market in
Japan, that is the introduction of bank subsidiary securities firms and their corporate bond
underwriting activities.  We examined yields on corporate bonds at the time of issue in view of
potential net conflict of interest or net certification effect.  The main bank system in Japan where a
main bank has a particularly close relationship with its borrowers provides a good opportunity for
testing these hypothesis.  Although the entire sample do not show significant differences with
regard to the type of underwriters, subsample analysis reveals contrasting results.  In the earlier
period when main bank subsidiaries were aggressively pursuing the new business, the result was
consistent with net the certification effect or main banks undercutting the yield in order to attract
business.  On the other hand, in the later period, the result is consistent with the hypothesis that
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Table 1
Bank Subsidiary Securities Firms
Date of Establishment Name
July 1993 IBJ Securities
Norinchukin Securities
LTCB Securities
November 1993 Sumitomo Trust Securities
Mitsubishi Trust Securities
July 1994 Yasuda Trust Securities
Asahi Securities







(The last two merged to become Tokyo-Mitsubishi
Securities in April 1996)
March 1995 Tokai International Securities
May 1995 Mitsui Trust Securities
Hokkaido Takushoku Securities
November 1995 Toyo Trust Securities
Source: Kin’yu Business, March 1997, p. 92.
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Table 2
Bank Subsidiary Underwriting of Corporate Straight Bonds
94Q2 - 96Q3
Number of Issues Amount of Issues (Billion Yen)
Quarter Total Bank Total Bank
Subsidiary Subsidiary
Underwritten Underwritten
94:2 18 1 520 10
94:3 12 3 250 30
94:4 11 0 275 0
95:1 33 14 532 183
95:2 30 8 580 100
95:3 65 25 1,010 316
95:4 71 29 983 383
96:1 58 27 1,200 320
96:2 66 34 839 385
96:3 82 45 1,060 512
Total 446 186 7,249 2,239
Source: Nikkei NEEDS database. Calculation by the authors.
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Table 3
Characteristics of Bonds Underwritten by Bank Subsidiaries
February 25, 1994 - September 30, 1996
Entire Sample Bank Underwriting Main Bank
Underwriting
Number of 432 182 118
Observations
Amount of Issue 16.095 12.198*** 12.725***
(Billion Yen)
Yield Spread 0.255 0.265 0.249
(Percentage Points)
Debt/Capital 0.332 0.342 0.326
(Market)
Interest Coverage 1.893 1.977 1.958
Loan/Debt 0.507 0.522 0.537*
Market 529.005 497.101 507.311
Capitalization
(Billion Yen)
Total Assets 1,215.789 1,227.542 1,193.151
(Billion Yen)
Main Bank Loan/ 0.072 0.074 0.083**
Total Debt
Use: Investment 0.431 0.401 0.373
Use: Repayment 0.625 0.643 0.627
Use: Working 0.176 0.192 0.186
Capital
Note: “Yield Spread” is the difference between corporate bond yield at issue and corresponding JGB yield.  (See text for the
exact computation of JGB portfolio yield.)  “Debt/Capital (Market)” is book debt (interest bearing liabilities) divided by
market value of equity plus book value of debt.  “Interest Coverage” is earnings before interest and taxes divided by interest
expenses.  “Loan/Debt” and “Main Bank Loan/Total Debt” are computed using book value of loan and debt.  “Market
Capitalization” is number of shares outstanding times price per share.  “Total Assets” is the size of balance sheet (in book). 
“Use” shows percentage of these reasons.  (Multiple reasons are possible). A “*”, “**”, and “***” indicate significant
differences from their complements at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4
Regression of Yield Spread on Firm and Bond Characteristics
Entire Sample JBRI Rated Firms
Bank Main Bank Bank Main Bank
Underwriting Underwriting Underwriting Underwriting








Maturity < 5 0.106 0.104 0.093 0.095
years (3.52) (3.45) (2.03) (2.07)
Maturity = 7 -0,087 -0.090 -0.158 -0.158
years (-2.30) (-2.37) (-2.78) (-2.80)
BBB or BBB+ 0.416 0.408
(2.21) (2.18)
A-, A, or A+ 0.128 0.123
(0.72) (0.69)




Main Bank -0.035 -0.034
Subsidiary (-1.19) (-0.74)
Number of obs 432 432 193 193
Adjusted R 0.359 0.361 0.386 0.3872
Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from cross-section regression of yield spread (the
difference between corporate bond yield at issue and corresponding JGB yield) on various firm
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characteristics and industry dummies. Coefficients on industry dummies are not reported.  “Total
Assets” is the size of balance sheet (in book).  “Debt/Capital (Market)” is book debt (interest
bearing liabilities) divided by market value of equity plus book value of debt.  “Interest Coverage”
is earnings before interest and taxes divided by interest expenses.  “Loan/Debt” and “Main Bank
Loan/Total Debt are computed using book value of loan and debt.  “Maturity < 5 years” is a
dummy variable that takes the value one if the maturity of the corporate bond is relatively short
(3, 4, or 5 years) and zero if the maturity is long (6, 7, 8, or 10 years).  “Maturity = 7 years” is a
dummy variable that takes the value one if the maturity of corporate bond is 7 years and zero
otherwise.  “Bank Subsidiary” and “Main Bank Subsidiary”are dummy variables that take value 1
when the bond is underwritten by bank subsidiaries or main bank subsidiaries and 0 otherwise. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
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Table 5
Regression of Yield Spread on Firm and Bond Characteristics: Sub-period Results
Before October 1, 1995 After October 1, 1995
Bank Main Bank Bank Main Bank
Underwriting Underwriting Underwriting Underwriting
Log (Total -0.074 -0.073 -0.154 -0.156
Asset) (-2.54) (-2.57) (-9.56) (-9.77)
Debt/Capital 0.477 0.474 0.345 0.373
(Market) (1.75) (1.75) (1.82) (1.96)
Interest -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.026 -0.025
Coverage (-0.13) (-0.10) (-2.38) (-2.31)
Loan/Debt 0.017 0.025 0.117 0.101
(0.13) (0.18) (1.54) (1.32)
Bank -0.083 0.053
Subsidiary (-1.49) (1.76)
Main Bank -0.103 0.062
Subsidiary (-1.81) (1.82)
Number of obs 151 151 245 245
Adjusted R 0.207 0.214 0.403 0.4042
Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from cross-section regression of yield spread (the difference between corporate
bond yield at issue and corresponding JGB portfolio yield) on various firm characteristics and industry dummies, for two sub-
periods.  Coefficients on industry dummies are not reported.  “Total Assets” is the size of balance sheet (in book). 
“Debt/Capital (Market)” is book debt (interest bearing liabilities) divided by market value of equity plus book value of debt. 
“Interest Coverage” is earnings before interest and taxes divided by interest expenses.  “Loan/Debt” and “Main Bank
Loan/Total Debt” are computed using book value of loan and debt.  “Bank Subsidiary” and “Main Bank Subsidiary”are dummy
variables that take value 1 when the bond is underwritten by bank subsidiaries or main bank subsidiaries and 0 otherwise. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
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Table 6
Regression of Yield Spread on Firm Characteristics:
Sub-period Results for JBRI Rated Firms
Before October 1, 1995 After October 1, 1995
Bank Main Bank Bank Main Bank
Underwriting Underwriting Underwriting Underwriting
BBB or BBB+ 0.247 0.247 0.949 0.965
(1.37) (1.37) (8.78) (9.12)
A-, A, or A+ 0.228 0.228 0.524 0.542
(2.69) (2.69) (5.83) (6.13)




Main Bank -0.159 0.085
Subsidiary (-1.54) (1.96)
Number of obs 63 63 108 108
Adjusted R 0.186 0.186 0.579 0.5932
Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from cross-section regression of yield spread (the difference between corporate
bond yield at issue and corresponding JGB portfolio yield) on various firm characteristics and industry dummies, for two sub-
periods.  Coefficients on industry dummies are not reported.  “Bank Subsidiary” and “Main Bank Subsidiary”are dummy
variables that take value 1 when the bond is underwritten by bank subsidiaries or main bank subsidiaries and 0 otherwise. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  Columns 1 and 2 are the same since bank subsidiaries that underwrote bonds in this
sub-period exactly coincided with main bank subsidiaries.
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Table 7
Probit Model of the Choice of Underwriters
Entire Sample Before October 1, After October 1,
1995 1995
Constant 8.73 11.89 6.36
(4.77) (3.47) (2.81)
Log (Issue) -0.570 -0.802 -0.422
(-5.07) (-3.89) (-3.02)
Debt/Capital 0.777 0.424 0.692
(Market) (1.45) (0.47) (0.99)
Interest Coverage 0.034 -0.073 0.056
(0.82) (-0.92) (1.05)
Loan/Debt 0.144 0.049 0.341
(0.47) (0.09) (0.89)
Main Bank has a -0.057 0.663 -0.068
Securities (-0.27) (0.97) (-0.29)
Subsidiary
Number of Obs. 396 151 108
Note: Dependent variable is “Bank Subsidiary” variable.
